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Abstract
Argumentation has proved a useful tool in defining formal semantics for assumption-based reasoning
by viewing a proof as a process in which proponents and opponents attack each others arguments by
undercuts (attack to an argument’s premise) and rebuts (attack to an argument’s conclusion). In this
paper, we formulate a variety of notions of attack for extended logic programs from combinations
of undercuts and rebuts and define a general hierarchy of argumentation semantics parameterised by
the notions of attack chosen by proponent and opponent. We prove the equivalence and subset rela-
tionships between the semantics and examine some essential properties concerning consistency and
the coherence principle, which relates default negation and explicit negation. Most significantly, we
place existing semantics put forward in the literature in our hierarchy and identify a particular argu-
mentation semantics for which we prove equivalence to the paraconsistent well-founded semantics
with explicit negation, WFSXp. Finally, we present a general proof theory, based on dialogue trees,
and show that it is sound and complete with respect to the argumentation semantics.
Keywords: Non-monotonic Reasoning, Extended Logic Programming, Argumentation se-
mantics, Well-founded Semantics with Explicit Negation
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1 Introduction
Argumentation has attracted much interest in the area of Artificial Intelligence. On the one
hand, argumentation is an important way of human interaction and reasoning, and is there-
fore of interest for research into intelligent agents. Application areas include automated ne-
gotiation via argumentation (Parsons et al. 1998; Kraus et al. 1998; Schroeder 1999) and
legal reasoning (Prakken and Sartor 1997). On the other hand, argumentation provides a
formal model for various assumption based (or non-monotonic, or default) reasoning for-
malisms (Bondarenko et al. 1997; Chesn˜evar et al. 2000). In particular, various argumen-
tation based semantics have been proposed for logic programming with default nega-
tion (Bondarenko et al. 1997; Dung 1995).
Argumentation semantics are elegant since they can be captured in an abstract frame-
work (Dung 1995; Bondarenko et al. 1997; Vreeswijk 1997; Jakobovits and Vermeir 1999b),
for which an elegant theory of attack, defence, acceptability, and other notions can be de-
veloped, without recourse to the concrete instance of the reasoning formalism at hand. This
framework can then be instantiated to various assumption based reasoning formalisms.
Similarly, a dialectical proof theory, based on dialogue trees, can be defined for an abstract
argumentation framework, and then applied to any instance of such a framework (Simari et al. 1994;
Dung 1995; Jakobovits and Vermeir 1999a).
In general, an argument A is a proof which may use a set of defeasible assumptions.
Another argumentB may have a conclusion which contradicts the assumptions or the con-
clusions ofA, and therebyB attacksA. There are two fundamental notions of such attacks:
undercut and rebut (Pollock 1987; Prakken and Sartor 1997) or equivalently ground-attack
and reductio-ad-absurdum attack (Dung 1993). We will use the terminology of undercuts
and rebuts. Both attacks differ in that an undercut attacks a premise of an argument, while
a rebut attacks a conclusion.
Given a logic program we can define an argumentation semantics by iteratively collect-
ing those arguments which are acceptable to a proponent, i.e. they can be defended against
all opponent attacks. In fact, such a notion of acceptability can be defined in a number of
ways depending on which attacks we allow the proponent and opponent to use.
Normal logic programs do not have negative conclusions, which means that we cannot
use rebuts. Thus both opponents can only launch undercuts on each other’s assumptions.
Various argumentation semantics have been defined for normal logic programs (Bondarenko et al. 1997;
Dung 1995; Kakas and Toni 1999), some of which are equivalent to existing semantics
such as the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) or the well-founded se-
mantics (van Gelder et al. 1991).
Extended logic programs (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1990; Alferes and Pereira 1996; Wagner 1994),
on the other hand, introduce explicit negation, which states that a literal is explicitly false.
As a result, both undercuts and rebuts are possible forms of attack; there are further varia-
tions depending on whether any kind of counter-attack is admitted. A variety of argumenta-
tion semantics arise if one allows one notion of attack as defence for the proponent, and an-
other as attack for the opponent. Various argumentation semantics have been proposed for
extended logic programs (Dung 1993; Prakken and Sartor 1997; Mo´ra and Alferes 1998;
?). Dung has shown that a certain argumentation semantics is equivalent to the answer
set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1990), a generalisation of the stable model seman-
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tics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988). For the well-founded semantics with explicit negation,
WFSX (Pereira and Alferes 1992; Alferes and Pereira 1996), there exists a scenario se-
mantics (Alferes et al. 1993) which is similar to an argumentation semantics. This seman-
tics applies only to non-contradictory programs; to our knowledge, no argumentation se-
mantics has yet been found equivalent to the paraconsistent well-founded semantics with
explicit negation, WFSXp (Dama´sio 1996; Alferes et al. 1995; Alferes and Pereira 1996).
This paper makes the following contributions: we identify various notions of attack for
extended logic programs. We set up a general framework of argumentation semantics, pa-
rameterised on these notions of attacks. This framework is then used to classify notions of
justified arguments, and to compare them to the argumentation semantics of (Dung 1993)
and (Prakken and Sartor 1997), among others. We examine some properties of the differ-
ent semantics, concerning consistency, and the coherence principle which relates explicit
and implicit negation. One particular argumentation semantics is then shown to be equiv-
alent to the paraconsistent well-founded semantics with explicit negation (Dama´sio 1996).
Finally, we develop a general dialectical proof theory for the notions of justified arguments
we introduce, and show how proof procedures for these proof theories can be derived. This
paper builds upon an earlier conference publication (Schweimeier and Schroeder 2002),
which reports initial findings, while this article provides detailed coverage including all
proofs and detailed examples.
The paper is organised as follows: First we define arguments and notions of attack and
acceptability. Then we set up a framework for classifying different least fixpoint argumen-
tation semantics, based on different notions of attack. Section 4 examines some properties
(coherence and consistency) of these semantics. In Section 5, we recall the definition of
WFSXp, and prove the equivalence of an argumentation semantics and WFSXp. A general
dialectical proof theory for arguments is presented in Section 6; we prove its soundness
and completeness and outline how a proof procedure for the proof theory may be derived.
2 Extended Logic Programming and Argumentation
We introduce extended logic programming and summarise the definitions of arguments
associated with extended logic programs. We identify various notions of attack between
arguments, and define a variety of semantics parametrised on these notions of attack.
Extended logic programming extends logic programming by two kinds of negation: de-
fault negation and explicit negation. The former allows the assumption of the falsity of a
fact if there is no evidence for this fact. Explicit negation, on the other hand, allows to
explicitly assert the falsity of a fact.
The default negation of a literal p, written not p, states the assumption of the falsity of
p. The assumption not p is intended to be true iff there is no evidence of p. Thus, the truth
of not p relies on a lack of knowledge about p. An operational interpretation of default
negation is given by negation as failure (Clark 1978): the query not p succeeds iff the
query p fails. Default negation is usually not allowed in the head of a rule: the truth value
of not p is defined in terms of p, and so there should not be any other rules that define
not p.
Default negation thus gives a way of expressing a kind of negation, based on a lack of
knowledge about a fact. Sometimes, however, it is desirable to express the explicit knowl-
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edge of the falsity of a fact. The explicit negation ¬p of a literal p states that p is known to
be false. In contrast to default negation, an explicit negation ¬p is allowed in the head of a
rule, and there is no other way of deriving ¬p except by finding an applicable rule with ¬p
as its consequence.
Consider the following example 1: “A school bus may cross the railway tracks under the
condition that there is no approaching train.” It may be expressed using default negation as
cross← not train
This is a dangerous statement, however: assume that there is no knowledge about an ap-
proaching train, e.g. because the driver’s view is blocked. In this case, the default negation
not train is true, and we conclude that the bus may cross. Instead, it would be appropriate
to demand the explicit knowledge that there is no approaching train, as expressed using
explicit negation:
cross← ¬train
The combination of default and explicit negation also allows for a more cautious statement
of positive facts: while the rule
¬cross← train
states that the driver should not cross if there is a train approaching, the rule
¬cross← not ¬train
states more cautiously that the driver should not cross if it has not been established that
there is no train approaching. In contrast to the former rule, the latter rule prevents a driver
from crossing if there is no knowledge about approaching trains.
A connection between the two kind of negations may be made by asserting the coherence
principle (Pereira and Alferes 1992; Alferes and Pereira 1996): it states that whenever an
explicit negation ¬p is true, then the default negation not p is also true. This corresponds
to the statement that if something is known to be false, then it should also be assumed to
be false.
2.1 Arguments
Definition 1
An objective literal is an atom A or its explicit negation ¬A. We define ¬¬L = L. A
default literal is of the form not L where L is an objective literal. A literal is either an
objective or a default literal.
An extended logic program is a (possibly infinite) set of rules of the form
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Lm+n(m,n ≥ 0),
where each Li is an objective literal (0 ≤ i ≤ m + n). For such a rule r, we call L0 the
head of the rule, head(r), and L1, . . . , not Lm+n the body of the rule, body(r). A rule
with an empty body is called a fact, and we write L0 instead of L0 ←.
Our definition of an argument associated with an extended logic program is based on (Prakken and Sartor 1997).
1 Due to John McCarthy, first published in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1990)
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Essentially, an argument is a partial proof, resting on a number of assumptions, i.e. a set of
default literals.2 Note that we do not consider priorities of rules, as used e.g. in (Antoniou 2002;
Kakas and Moraitis 2002; Prakken and Sartor 1997; Brewka 1996; Garcı´a et al. 1998; Vreeswijk 1997).
Also, we do not distinguish between strict rules, which may not be attacked, and de-
feasible rules, which may be attacked (Prakken and Sartor 1997; Simari and Loui 1992;
Garcı´a et al. 1998).
Definition 2
Let P be an extended logic program. An argument associated with P is a finite sequence
A = [r1, . . . rn] of ground instances of rules ri ∈ P such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for
every objective literal Lj in the body of ri there is a k > i such that head(rk) = Lj .
A subargument of A is a subsequence of A which is an argument. The head of a rule in A
is called a conclusion of A, and a default literal not L in the body of a rule of A is called
an assumption of A. We write assm(A) for the set of assumptions and conc(A) for the set
of conclusions of an argument A.
An argument A with a conclusion L is a minimal argument for L if there is no subargu-
ment of A with conclusion L. An argument is minimal if it is minimal for some literal L.
Given an extended logic program P , we denote the set of minimal arguments associated
with P by ArgsP .
The restriction to minimal arguments (cf. (Simari and Loui 1992)) is not essential, but
convenient, since it rules out arguments constructed from several unrelated arguments.
Generally, one is interested in the conclusions of an argument, and wants to avoid hav-
ing rules in an argument which do not contribute to the desired conclusion. Furthermore,
when designing a proof procedure to compute justified arguments, one generally wants to
compute only minimal arguments, for reasons of efficiency.
Example 1
Consider the following program:
¬cross ← not ¬train
cross ← ¬train
train ← see train
¬train ← not train, wear glasses
wear glasses
The program models the example from the introduction to this section. A bus is allowed to
cross the railway tracks if it is known that there is no train approaching; otherwise, it is not
allowed to cross. A train is approaching if the driver can see the train, and it is known that
there is no train approaching if there is no evidence of a train approaching, and the driver
is wearing glasses.
There is exactly one minimal argument with conclusion cross:
[cross← ¬train;¬train← not train, wear glasses;wear glasses]
2 In (Bondarenko et al. 1997; Dung 1993), an argument is a set of assumptions; the two approaches are equiv-
alent in that there is an argument with a conclusion L iff there is a set of assumptions from which L can be
inferred. See the discussion in (Prakken and Sartor 1997).
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It contains as subarguments the only minimal arguments for ¬train and wear glasses:
[¬train← not train, wear glasses]
[wear glasses]
There is also exactly one minimal argument with conclusion ¬cross:
[¬cross← not ¬train]
There is no argument with conclusion train, because there is no rule for see train.
2.2 Notions of attack
There are two fundamental notions of attack: undercut, which invalidates an assumption
of an argument, and rebut, which contradicts a conclusion of an argument (Dung 1993;
Prakken and Sartor 1997). From these, we may define further notions of attack, by allowing
either of the two fundamental kinds of attack, and considering whether any kind of counter-
attack is allowed or not. We will now formally define these notions of attack.
Definition 3
Let A1 and A2 be arguments.
1. A1 undercuts A2 if there is an objective literal L such that L is a conclusion
of A1 and not L is an assumption of A2.
2. A1 rebuts A2 if there is an objective literal L such that L is a conclusion of
A1 and ¬L is a conclusion of A2.
3. A1 attacks A2 if A1 undercuts or rebuts A2.
4. A1 defeats A2 if
• A1 undercuts A2, or
• A1 rebuts A2 and A2 does not undercut A1.
5. A1 strongly attacks A2 if A1 attacks A2 and A2 does not undercut A1.
6. A1 strongly undercuts A2 if A1 undercuts A2 and A2 does not undercut A1.
The notions of undercut and rebut, and hence attack are fundamental for extended logic
programs (Dung 1993; Prakken and Sartor 1997). The notion of defeat is used in (Prakken and Sartor 1997),
along with a notion of strict defeat, i.e. a defeat that is not counter-defeated. For arguments
without priorities, rebuts are symmetrical, and therefore strict defeat coincides with strict
undercut, i.e. an undercut that is not counter-undercut. For this reason, we use the term
strong undercut instead of strict undercut, and similarly define strong attack to be an attack
which is not counter-undercut. We will use the following abbreviations for these notions
of attack. r for rebuts, u for undercuts, a for attacks, d for defeats, sa for strongly attacks,
and su for strongly undercuts.
Example 2
Consider the program of example 1. There are the following minimal arguments:
A : [cross← ¬train;¬train← not train, wear glasses;wear glasses]
B : [¬cross← not ¬train]
C : [¬train← not train, wear glasses]
D : [wear glasses]
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The argument A and B rebut each other. The subargument C of A also undercuts B, so
A also undercuts B. Therefore A strongly attacks B, while B does not strongly attack or
defeat A.
Example 3
The arguments [q ← not p] and [p ← not q] undercut each other. As a result, they do not
strongly undercut each other.
The arguments [p ← not q] and [¬p ← not r] do not undercut each other, but strongly
attack each other.
The argument [¬p← not r] strongly undercuts [p← not ¬p] and [p← not ¬p] attacks
- but does not defeat - the argument [¬p← not r].
These notions of attack define for any extended logic program a binary relation on the
set of arguments associated with that program.
Definition 4
A notion of attack is a function x which assigns to each extended logic programP a binary
relation xP on the set of arguments associated with P , i.e. xP ⊆ ArgsP ×ArgsP . Notions
of attack are partially ordered by defining x ⊆ y iff ∀P : xP ⊆ yP
Notation We will use sans-serif font for the specific notions of attack introduced in Def-
inition 3 and their abbreviations: r, u, a, d, sa, and su. We will use x, y, z, . . . to denote
variables for notions of attacks. Arguments are denoted by A,B,C, . . .
The term “attack” is somewhat overloaded: 1. it is the notion of attack a consisting
of a rebut or an undercut; we use this terminology because it is standard in the litera-
ture (Dung 1993; Prakken and Sartor 1997). 2. in general, an attack is a binary relation
on the set of arguments of a program; we use the term “notion of attack”. 3. if the argu-
mentation process is viewed as a dialogue between an proponent who puts forward an
argument, and an opponent who tries to dismiss it, we may choose one notion of attack
for the use of the proponent, and another notion of attack for the opponent. In such a set-
ting, we call the former notion of attack the “defence”, and refer to the latter as “attack”,
in the hope that the meaning of the term “attack” will be clear from the context.
Definition 5
Let x be a notion of attack. Then the inverse of x, denoted by x−1, is defined as x−1P =
{(B,A) | (A,B) ∈ xP }.
In this relational notation, Definition 3 can be rewritten as a = u∪ r, d = u∪ (r− u−1),
sa = (u ∪ r) − u−1, and su = u− u−1.
Proposition 1
The notions of attack of Definition 3 are partially ordered according to the diagram in
Figure 1.
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attacks = a = u ∪ r
defeats = d = u ∪ (r− u−1)
ii
ii
iii
iii
iii
VVV
VV
VVV
VV
VV
undercuts = u
UU
UU
UU
UU
UU
UU
strongly attacks = sa = (u ∪ r)− u−1
ii
iii
iii
ii
ii
strongly undercuts = su = u− u−1
Fig. 1. Notions of Attack
Proof
A simple exercise, using the set-theoretic laws A−B ⊆ A ⊆ A ∪C and (A ∪B)−C =
(A− C) ∪ (B − C) (for any arbitrary sets A, B, and C).
As mentioned above, we will work with notions of attack as examined in previous litera-
ture. Therefore Figure 1 contains the notions of undercut (Dung 1993; Prakken and Sartor 1997),
attack (Dung 1993; Prakken and Sartor 1997), defeat (Prakken and Sartor 1997), strong
undercut (Prakken and Sartor 1997), and strong attack as an intermediate notion between
strongly undercuts and defeats. All of these notions of attack are extensions of under-
cuts. The reason is that undercuts are asymmetric, i.e. for two arguments A, B, AuB
does not necessarily imply BuA. Rebuts, on the other hand, are symmetric, i.e. ArB im-
plies BrA. As a consequence, rebuts on their own always lead to a “draw” between argu-
ments. There is, however, a lot of work on priorities between arguments (Antoniou 2002;
Kakas and Moraitis 2002; Prakken and Sartor 1997; Brewka 1996; Garcı´a et al. 1998; Vreeswijk 1997),
which implies that rebuts become asymmetric and therefore lead to more interesting se-
mantics. But the original, more basic approach does not consider this extension, and hence
undercuts play the prime role and notions of attack mainly based on rebuts, such as r or
r − u−1, are not considered.
The following example shows that the inclusions in Figure 1 are strict.
Example 4
Consider the following program:
p ← not ¬p
p ← not q
¬p ← not r
q ← not p
¬ q ← not s
It has the minimal arguments {[p← not¬p], [p← not q], [¬p← not r], [q ← not p], [¬ q ←
not s]}. The arguments [p ← not q] and [q ← not p] undercut (and hence defeat) each
other, but they do not strongly undercut or strongly attack each other. The arguments
[q ← not r] and [¬q ← not s] strongly attack (and hence defeat) each other, but they
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do not undercut each other. The argument [p ← not ¬p] attacks [¬p ← not r], but it does
not defeat it, because [¬p← not r] (strongly) undercuts [p← not ¬p].
2.3 Acceptability and justified arguments
Given the above notions of attack, we define acceptability of an argument. Basically, an
argument is acceptable if it can be defended against any attack. Our definition of accept-
ability is parametrised on the notions of attack allowed for the proponent and the opponent.
Acceptability forms the basis for our argumentation semantics, which is defined as
the least fixpoint of a function, which collects all acceptable arguments (Pollock 1987;
Simari and Loui 1992; Prakken and Sartor 1997; Dung 1993). The least fixpoint is of par-
ticular interest, because it provides a canonical fixpoint semantics and it can be constructed
inductively.
Because the semantics is based on parametrised acceptability, we obtain a uniform
framework for defining a variety of argumentation semantics for extended logic programs.
It can be instantiated to a particular semantics by choosing one notion of attack for the
opponent, and another notion of attack as a defence for the proponent. The uniformity
of the definition makes it a convenient framework for comparing different argumentation
semantics.
Definition 6
Let x and y be notions of attack. Let A be an argument, and S a set of arguments. Then
A is x/y-acceptable wrt. S if for every argument B such that (B,A) ∈ x there exists an
argumentC ∈ S such that (C,B) ∈ y.
Based on the notion of acceptability, we can then define a fixpoint semantics for argu-
ments.
Definition 7
Let x and y be notions of attack, and P an extended logic program. The operator FP,x/y :
P(ArgsP )→ P(ArgsP ) is defined as
FP,x/y(S) = {A | A is x/y-acceptable wrt. S}
We denote the least fixpoint of FP,x/y by JP,x/y. If the programP is clear from the context,
we omit the subscript P . An argument A is called x/y-justified if A ∈ Jx/y; an argument
is called x/y-overruled if it is attacked by an x/y-justified argument; and an argument is
called x/y-defensible if it is neither x/y-justified nor x/y-overruled.
Note that this definition implies that the logic associated with justified arguments is 3-
valued, with justified arguments corresponding to true literals, overruled arguments to false
literals, and defensible arguments to undefined literals. We could also consider arguments
which are both justified and overruled; these correspond to literals with the truth value
overdetermined of Belnap’s four-valued logic (Belnap 1977).
Proposition 2
For any program P , the operator FP,x/y is monotone. By the Knaster-Tarski fixpoint the-
orem (Tarski 1955; Birkhoff 1967), FP,x/y has a least fixpoint. It can be constructed by
transfinite induction as follows:
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a/x d/x
u/u =
u/su
u/a =
u/d =
u/sa
sa/sa =
sa/su
sa/a =
sa/d =
sa/u
su/x
1 ∅ [s] [s] [s]
[p ← not q],
[s]
[p ← not q],
[s]
[p ← not q],
[q ← not p],
[s]
2 ∅ ∅ [¬q ← not r] [¬q ← not r] ∅ [¬q ← not r] [¬q ← not r]
3 ∅ ∅ ∅ [p← not q] ∅ ∅ ∅
4 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Table 1. Computing justified arguments – the n-th row shows the justified arguments
added at the n-th iteration
J0x/y := ∅
Jα+1
x/y
:= FP,x/y(J
α
x/y) for α+1 a successor ordinal
Jλx/y :=
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/y for λ a limit ordinal
Then there exists a least ordinal λ0 such that Fx/y(Jλ0x/y) = J
λ0
x/y =: Jx/y.
Proof
Let S1 ⊆ S2, and A ∈ FP,x/y , i.e. A is x/y-acceptable wrt. S1, i.e. every x-attack against
A is y-attacked by an argument in S1. Then A is also x/y-acceptable wrt. S2, because
S1 ⊆ S2, i.e. S2 contains more arguments to defend A.
Note that our general framework encompasses some well-known argumentation se-
mantics for extended logic programs: Dung’s grounded semantics (Dung 1993) is Ja/u.
Prakken and Sartor’s argumentation semantics (Prakken and Sartor 1997), without priori-
ties or strict rules is Jd/su. If we regard explicitly negated literals ¬L as new atoms, unre-
lated to the positive literal L, then we can apply the well-founded argumentation semantics
of (Bondarenko et al. 1997; Kakas and Toni 1999) to extended logic programs, and obtain
Ju/u.
Example 5
Consider the following program P :
p ← not q
q ← not p
¬q ← not r
r ← not s
s
¬s ← not s
Table 1 shows the computation of justified arguments associated with P . The columns
show various combinations x/y of attack/defence, and a row n shows those arguments A
that get added at iteration stage n, i.e. A ∈ JnP,x/y and A 6∈ J
n−1
P,x/y .
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The set of arguments associated withP is {[p← not q], [q ← not p], [¬q ← not r], [r ←
not s], [s], [¬s← not s]}.
All arguments are undercut by another argument, except [s]; the only attack against [s] is
a rebut by [¬s← not s], which is not a defeat. Thus, [s] is identified as a justified argument
at stage 0 in all semantics, except if attacks is allowed as an attack. In the latter case, no
argument is justified at stage 0, hence the set of justified arguments Ja/x is empty.
3 Relationships between Notions of Justifiability
The definition of justified arguments provides a variety of semantics for extended logic
programs, depending on which notion of attack x is admitted to attack an argument, and
which notion of attack y may be used as a defence.
This section is devoted to an analysis of the relationship between the different notions
of justifiability, leading to a hierarchy of notions of justifiability illustrated in Figure 2.
3.1 Equivalence of argumentation semantics
We will prove a series of theorems, which show that some of the argumentation semantics
defined above are subsumed by others, and that some of them are actually equivalent. Thus,
we establish a hierarchy of argumentation semantics, which is illustrated in Figure 2.
First of all, it is easy to see that the least fixpoint increases if we weaken the attacks or
strengthen the defence.
Theorem 3
Let x′ ⊆ x and y ⊆ y′ be notions of attack, then Jx/y ⊆ Jx′/y′ .
Proof
See Appendix A.
Theorem 4 states that it does not make a difference if we allow only the strong version
of the defence. This is because an argument need not defend itself on its own, but it may
rely on other arguments to defend it.
Theorem 4
Let x and and y be notions of attack such that x ⊇ undercuts, and let sy = y−undercuts−1.
Then Jx/y = Jx/sy .
Proof
Informally, every x-attack B to an x/y-justified argumentA is y-defended by some x/sy-
justified argument C (by induction). Now if C is not a sy-attack, then it is undercut by B,
and because x ⊇ undercuts and C is justified, there exists a strong defence for C against
B, which is also a defence of the original argument A against C.
The formal proof is by transfinite induction. By Theorem 3, we have Jx/sy ⊆ Jx/y . We
prove the inverse inclusion by showing that for all ordinals α: Jαx/y ⊆ Jαx/sy , by transfinite
induction on α. See Appendix A for the detailed proof.
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In particular, the previous Theorem states that undercut and strong undercut are equiva-
lent as a defence, as are attack and strong attack. This may be useful in an implementation,
where we may use the stronger notion of defence without changing the semantics, thereby
decreasing the number of arguments to be checked. The following Corollary shows that
because defeat lies between attack and strong attack, it is equivalent to both as a defence.
Corollary 5
Let x be a notion of attack such that x ⊇ undercuts. Then Jx/a = Jx/d = Jx/sa.
Proof
It follows from Theorems 3 and 4 that Jx/sa ⊆ Jx/d ⊆ Jx/a = Jx/sa.
The following theorem states that defence with undercuts is equally strong as one with
defeats or with attacks, provided the opponent’s permitted attacks include at least the
strong attacks.
Theorem 6
Let x be a notion of attack such that x ⊇ strongly attacks. Then Jx/u = Jx/d = Jx/a.
Proof
It is sufficient to show that Jx/a ⊆ Jx/u. Then by Theorem 3, Jx/u ⊆ Jx/d ⊆ Jx/a = Jx/u.
Informally, every x-attack B to a x/a-justified argument A is attacked by some x/u-
justified argument C (by induction). If C is a rebut, but not an undercut, then because
B strongly attacks C, and because x ⊇ strongly attacks, there must have been an argu-
ment defending C by undercutting B, thereby also defending A against B.
We prove by transfinite induction that for all ordinals α: Jαx/a ⊆ Jαx/u. See Appendix A for
the detailed proof.
In analogy to Theorem 6, strong undercuts are an equivalent defence to strong attacks if
the allowed attacks are strong attacks.
Theorem 7
Jsa/su = Jsa/sa
Proof
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 6. See Appendix A.
Theorem 8
Jsu/a = Jsu/d
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Proof
By Theorem 3, Jsu/d ⊆ Jsu/a.
We now show the inverse inclusion. Informally, every strong undercutB to a su/a-justified
argument A is attacked by some su/d-justified argument C (by induction). If C does not
defeat A, then there is some argument D defending C by defeating B, thereby also de-
fending A against B.
Formally, we show that for all ordinals α: Jα
su/a ⊆ J
α
su/d, by transfinite induction on α. See
Appendix A for the detailed proof.
These results are summarised in a hierarchy of argumentation semantics in Theorem 9
and Figure 2.
3.2 Distinguishing argumentation semantics
The previous section showed equality and subset relationships for a host of notions of justi-
fied arguments. In this section we complement these positive findings by negative findings
stating for which semantics there are no subset relationships. We prove these negative
statements by giving counter-examples distinguishing various notions of justifiability.
The first example shows that, in general, allowing only strong forms of attack for the
opponent leads to a more credulous semantics, because in cases where only non-strong
attacks exist, every argument is justified.
Example 6
Consider the following program:
p ← not q
q ← not p
For any notion of attack x, we have Jsu/x = Jsa/x = {[p ← not q], [q ← not p]},
because there is no strong undercut or strong attack to any of the arguments. However,
Ja/x = Jd/x = Ju/x = ∅, because every argument is undercut (and therefore defeated and
attacked).
Thus, in general, Js/x 6⊆ Jw/y, for s ∈ {su, sa}, w ∈ {a, u, d}, and any notions of attack
x and y.
The following example shows that some interesting properties need not hold for all
argumentation semantics: a fact (i.e. a rule with an empty body) need not necessarily lead
to a justified argument; this property distinguishes Dung’s (Dung 1993) and Prakken and
Sartor’s (Prakken and Sartor 1997) semantics from most of the others.
Example 7
Consider the following program:
p ← not q
q ← not p
¬p
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Let x be a notion of attack. Then Jd/x = Ja/x = ∅, because every argument is defeated
(hence attacked). Jsa/su = Jsa/sa = {[q ← not p]}, because [q ← not p] is the only
argument which is not strongly attacked, but it does not strongly attack any other argument.
Ju/su = Ju/u = {[¬p]}, because there is no undercut to [¬p], but [¬p] does not undercut
any other argument. Ju/a = {[¬p], [q ← not p]}, because there is no undercut to [¬p],
and the undercut [p ← not p] to [q ← not p] is attacked by [¬p]. We also have Jsa/u =
{[¬p], [q ← not p]}, because [q ← not p] is not strongly attacked, and the strong attack
[p← not q] on [¬p] is undercut by [q ← not p].
Thus, in general, Ju/x 6⊆ Jd/x, Ju/x 6⊆ Ja/x, Jsa/sx 6⊆ Ju/y (where sx ∈ {su, sa} and
y ∈ {u, su}), and Ju/y 6⊆ Jsa/sx (where sx ∈ {su, sa} and y ∈ {u, a, d, su, sa}).
The following example is similar to the previous example, except that all the undercuts
are strong, whereas in the previous example there were only non-strong undercuts.
Example 8
Consider the following program:
p ← not q
q ← not r
r ← not s
s ← not p
¬p
Let x be a notion of attack. Then Jsa/x = ∅, because every argument is strongly attacked.
Jsu/u = Jsu/su = {[¬p]}, because all arguments except [¬p] are strongly undercut,
but [¬p] does not undercut any argument. And Ju/a = Jsu/sa = Jsu/a = {[¬p], [q ←
not r], [s ← not p]}, because [¬p] is not undercut, and it defends [s ← not p] against the
strong undercut [p ← not q] (by rebut), and in turn, [s ← not p] defends [q ← not r]
against the strong undercut [r ← not s] (by strong undercut).
Thus, Ju/a 6⊆ Jsu/y , Jsu/sa 6⊆ Jsu/y , and Jsu/a 6⊆ Jsu/y , for y ∈ {u, su}.
The following example shows that in certain circumstances, non-strong defence allows
for more justified arguments than strong defence.
Example 9
Consider the following program:
p ← not q
q ← not p
r ← not p
Let x be a notion of attack. Then Ju/x = Jd/x = Ja/x = ∅, because every argument is
undercut. Jsu/su = Jsu/sa = Jsa/su = Jsa/sa = {[p ← not q], [q ← not p]} : In these
cases, the strong attacks are precisely the strong undercuts; the argument [r ← not p] is
not justified, because the strong undercut [p ← not q] is undercut, but not strongly under-
cut, by [q ← not p]. And finally, Jsu/u = Jsu/a = Jsa/u = Jsa/a = {[p ← not q], [q ←
not p], [r ← not p]} : Again, undercuts and attacks, and strong undercuts and strong at-
tacks, coincide; but now [r ← not p] is justified, because non-strong undercuts are allowed
as defence.
Thus, in general, Jx/u 6⊆ Jx/su and Jx/a 6⊆ Jx/sa, where x ∈ {su, sa}.
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The following example distinguishes the argumentation semantics of Dung (Dung 1993)
and Prakken and Sartor (Prakken and Sartor 1997).
Example 10
Consider the following program:
p ← not ¬p
¬p
Then Ja/x = ∅, because both arguments attack each other, while Jd/x = {[¬p]}, because
[¬p] defeats [p← not ¬p], but not vice versa.
Thus, Jd/x 6⊆ Ja/x.
The final example shows that if we do not allow any rebuts as attacks, then we obtain a
strictly more credulous semantics.
Example 11
Consider the following program:
¬p ← not q
¬q ← not p
p
q
Let x be a notion of attack. Then Jsa/x = Jd/x = Ja/x = ∅, because every argument is
strongly attacked (hence defeated and attacked), while Ju/x = Jsu/x = {[p], [q]}.
Thus, in general, Jv/x 6⊆ Jw/y, where v ∈ {u, su}, w ∈ {a, d, sa}, and x and y are any
notions of attack.
3.3 A hierarchy of argumentation semantics
We now summarise the results of this section, establishing a complete hierarchy of argu-
mentation semantics, parametrised on a pair of notions of attack x/y where x stands for the
attacks on an argument, and y for the possible defence. We locate in this hierarchy the argu-
mentation semantics of Dung (Dung 1993) and Prakken and Sartor (Prakken and Sartor 1997),
as well as the well-founded semantics for normal logic programs (van Gelder et al. 1991).
In Section 5 we will show that the paraconsistent well-founded semantics with explicit
negation, WFSXp (Dama´sio 1996), can also be found in our hierarchy. As a corollary, we
obtain precise relationships between these well-known semantics and our argumentation
semantics.
Theorem 9
The notions of justifiability are ordered (by set inclusion) according to the diagram in
Figure 2, where x/y lies below x′/y′ iff Jx/y ( Jx′/y′ .
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su/a = su/d
su/u
jjjjjjjjj
su/sa
SSSSSSSS
sa/u = sa/d = sa/a
oooooo
su/su
TTTTTTTTTTT
kkkkkkkkkk
u/a = u/d = u/sa
LLLLL
sa/su = sa/sa
OOOOO
jjjjjjjjj
u/su = u/u
SSSSSSSS
rrrrr
d/su = d/u = d/a = d/d = d/sa
TTTTTTT
kkkkkkk
a/su = a/u = a/a = a/d = a/sa
Fig. 2. Hierarchy of Notions of Justifiability
Proof
All equality and subset relationships (i.e. arcs between notions of justifiability) depicted in
Figure 2 are underpinned by the theorems in section 3.1. Two notions of justifiability are
not subsets of each other iff they are not equal and not connected by an arc in Figure 2.
These findings are underpinned by the counter-examples of section 3.2.
By definition, Prakken and Sartor’s semantics (Prakken and Sartor 1997), if we disre-
gard priorities, amounts to d/su-justifiability.
Similarly, Dung’s grounded argumentation semantics (Dung 1993) is exactly a/u-justifiability;
and if we treat explicitly negated literals as new atoms, we can apply the least fixpoint ar-
gumentation semantics for normal logic programs (Dung 1995; Bondarenko et al. 1997) to
extended logic programs, which is then, by definition, u/u-justifiability.
Note that these latter semantics use a slightly different notation to ours: arguments are
sets of assumptions (i.e. default literals), and a conclusion of an argument is a literal that
can be derived from these assumptions. This approach can be translated to ours by taking
as arguments all those derivations of a conclusion from an argument. Then the definitions
of the notions of attack and the fixpoint semantics coincide. See also the discussion in
(Prakken and Sartor 1997).
As corollaries to Theorem 9 we obtain relationships of these semantics to the other
notions of justifiability.
Corollary 10
Let JDung be the set of justified arguments according to Dung’s grounded argumenta-
tion semantics (Dung 1993). Then JDung = Ja/su = Ja/u = Ja/a = Ja/d = Ja/sa and
JDung ( Jx/y for all notions of attack x 6= a and y. Thus, in Dung’s semantics, it does not
matter which notion of attack, su,u,a,d,sa, is used as a defence, and Dung’s semantics is
more sceptical than the others.
Corollary 11
Let JPS be the set of justified arguments according to Prakken and Sartor’s argumentation
semantics (Prakken and Sartor 1997), where all arguments have the same priority. Then
JPS = Jd/su = Jd/u = Jd/a = Jd/d = Jd/sa, JPS ( Jx/y for all notions of attack
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x 6∈ {a, d} and y, and JPS ) Ja/y for all notions of attack y. Thus, in Prakken and
Sartor’s semantics, it does not matter which notion of attack, su,u,a,d,sa, is used as a
defence, and JPS is more credulous than Dung’s semantics, but more sceptical than all the
others.
Corollary 12
Let JWFS be the set of justified argument according to the well-founded argumentation
semantics for normal logic programs (Dung 1995; Bondarenko et al. 1997), where an ex-
plicitly negated atom ¬L is treated as unrelated to the positive atom L. Then JWFS =
Ju/u = Ju/su, JWFS ) Jd/y ) Ja/y, JWFS ( Jsu/y , and JWFS ( Ju/a = Ju/d = Ju/sa,
for all notions of attack y. Thus, in contrast to Dung’s and Prakken and Sartor’s semantics,
for WFS it makes a difference whether rebuts are permitted in the defence (a,d,sa) or not
(u,su).
Remark 1
1. The notions of a/x-, d/x- and sa/x-justifiability are particularly sceptical in that even
a fact p may not be justified, if there is a rule ¬p ← B (where not p 6∈ B) that is not
x-attacked. On the other hand this is useful in terms of avoiding inconsistency.
2. sx/y-justifiability is particularly credulous, because it does not take into account non-
strong attacks, so e.g. the program {p ← not q, q ← not p} has the justified arguments
[p← not q] and [q ← not p].
Remark 2
One might ask whether any of the semantics in Figure 2 are equivalent for non-contradictory
programs, i.e. programs for which there is no literal L such that there exist justified argu-
ments for both L and ¬L. The answer to this question is no: all the examples in Section 3.2
distinguishing different notions of justifiability involve only non-contradictory programs.
In particular, even for non-contradictory programs, Dung’s and Prakken and Sartor’s se-
mantics differ, and both differ from u/a-justifiability, which will be shown equivalent to the
paraconsistent well-founded semantics WFSXp (Dama´sio 1996; Pereira and Alferes 1992;
Alferes and Pereira 1996) in Section 5.
4 Properties of Argumentation Semantics
We will now state some important properties which a semantics for extended logic pro-
grams may have, and examine for which of the argumentation semantics these properties
hold.
4.1 The coherence principle
The coherence principle for extended logic programming (Alferes and Pereira 1996) states
that “explicit negation implies implicit negation”. If the intended meaning of not L is “if
there is no evidence forL, assume thatL is false”, and the intended meaning of¬L is “there
is evidence for the falsity of L”, then the coherence principle states that explicit evidence
is preferred over assumption of the lack of evidence. Formally, this can be stated as: if ¬L
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is in the semantics, then not L is also in the semantics. In an argumentation semantics, we
have not defined what it means for a default literal to be “in the semantics”. This can easily
be remedied, though, and for convenience we introduce the following transformation.3
Definition 8
LetP be an extended logic program, and x and y notions of attack, and letL be an objective
literal. Then L is x/y-justified if there exists a x/y-justified argument for L.
Let nL be a fresh atom, and P ′ = P ∪ {nL ← not L}. Then not L is x/y-justified if
[nL← not L] is a x/y-justified argument associated with P ′.
Note that because nL is fresh, then either Jx/y(P ′) = Jx/y(P ) or Jx/y(P ′) = Jx/y(P ) ∪
{[nL← not L]}.
Definition 9
A least fixpoint semantics Jx/y satisfies the coherence principle if for every objective literal
L, if ¬L is x/y-justified, then not L is x/y-justified.
The following result states that a least fixpoint semantics satisfies the coherence principle
exactly in those cases where we allow any attack for the defence. Informally, this is because
the only way of attacking a default literal not L is by undercut, i.e. an argument for L, and
in general, such an argument can only be attacked by an argument for ¬L by a rebut.
Theorem 13
Let x, y ∈ {a, u, d, su, sa}. Then Jx/y satisfies the coherence principle iff Jx/y = Jx/a.
Proof
• For the “only if” direction, we show that for those notions of justifiability x/y 6=
x/a, the coherence principle does not hold.
— Consider the program P :
p ← not q
q ← not r
r ← not s
s ← not p
¬p
Then Ju/u(P ′) = Jsu/u(P ′) = Jsu/su(P ′) = {[¬p]}, where P ′ = P ∪ {np ←
not p}. In these cases, the coherence principle is not satisfied, because ¬p is
justified, but not p is not justified.
— Now consider the program Q:
p ← not ¬p
¬p ← not p
Then Jsu/sa(Q′) = Jsa/sa(Q′) = {[p ← not ¬p], [¬p ← not p]}, where
Q′ = Q∪{np← not p}. Again, the coherence principle is not satisfied, because
¬p is justified, but not p is not justified.
3 The purpose of the transformation could be equally achieved by defining that not L is x/y-justified if all
arguments for L are overruled.
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• For the “if” direction, let x be any notion of attack. Let P be an extended logic pro-
gram, and¬L a x/a-justified literal, i.e. there is an argumentA = [¬L← Body, . . .]
and an ordinal α s.t. A ∈ Jαx/a.
Let A′ = [nL ← not L], and (B,A′) ∈ x. Because nL is fresh, the only possible
attack on A′ is a strong undercut, i.e. L is a conclusion of B. Then A attacks B, and
so [nL← not L] ∈ Jα+1x/a .
4.2 Consistency
Consistency is an important property of a logical system. It states that the system does not
support contradictory conclusions. In classical logic “ex falso quodlibet”, i.e. if both A and
¬A hold, then any formula holds. In paraconsistent systems (Dama´sio and Pereira 1998),
this property does not hold, thus allowing both A and ¬A to hold for a particular formula
A, while not supporting any other contradictions.
A set of arguments is consistent, or conflict-free (Prakken and Sartor 1997; Dung 1995),
if it does not contain two arguments such that one attacks the other. There are several
notions of consistency, depending on which notion of attack is considered undesirable.
Definition 10
Let x be a notion of attack, and P an extended logic program. Then a set of arguments
associated with P is called x-consistent if it does not contain argumentsA and B such that
(A,B) ∈ xP .
The argumentation semantics of an extended logic program need not necessarily be con-
sistent; because of explicit negation, there exist contradictory programs such as {p,¬p},
for which there exist sensible, but inconsistent arguments ([p] and [¬p] in this case).
A general result identifies cases in which the set of justified arguments for a program is
consistent. It states that if we allow the attack to be at least as strong as the defence, i.e. if
we are sceptical, then the set of justified arguments is consistent.
Theorem 14
Let x and y be notions of attack such that x⊇ y, and let P be an extended logic program.
Then the set of x/y-justified arguments is x-consistent.
Proof
We show that Jαx/y is x-consistent for all ordinals α, by transfinite induction on α.
Base case α = 0: Trivial.
Successor ordinal α  α + 1: Assume A,B ∈ Jα+1x/y and (A,B) ∈ x. Then there exists
C ∈ Jαx/y such that (C,A) ∈ y ⊆ x. Then by induction hypothesis, because C ∈ Jαx/y ,
then A 6∈ Jαx/y . Because A ∈ J
α+1
x/y , there exists D ∈ J
α
x/y such that (D,C) ∈ y ⊆ x. This
contradicts the induction hypothesis, so we have to retract the assumption and conclude
that Jα+1x/y is x-consistent.
Limit ordinal λ: Assume A,B ∈ Jλx/y and (A,B) ∈ x. Then there exist α, β < λ s.t. A ∈
Jαx/y and B ∈ J
β
x/y . W.l.o.g. assume that α ≤ β. Then because J
α
x/y ⊆ J
β
x/y , we have
A ∈ Jβx/y , contradicting the induction hypothesis that J
β
x/y is x-consistent.
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The following example shows that, in general, the set of justified arguments may well
be inconsistent.
Example 12
Consider the following program:
q ← not p
p
¬p
Then Ju/a = {[q ← not p], [p], [¬p]}, and [p] and [¬p] rebut each other, and [p] strongly
undercuts [q ← not p].
5 Argumentation Semantics and WFSX
In this section we will prove that the argumentation semantics Ju/a is equivalent to the para-
consistent well-founded semantics with explicit negation WFSXp (Dama´sio 1996; Alferes and Pereira 1996).
First, we summarise the definition of WFSXp.
5.1 Well-founded semantics with explicit negation
We recollect the definition of the paraconsistent well-founded semantics for extended logic
programs, WFSXp. We use the definition of (Alferes et al. 1995), because it is closer to our
definition of argumentation semantics than the original definition of (Pereira and Alferes 1992).
Definition 11
The set of all objective literals of a programP is called the Herbrand base ofP and denoted
by H(P ). A paraconsistent interpretation of a program P is a set T ∪ not F where T and
F are subsets of H(P ). An interpretation is a paraconsistent interpretation where the sets
T and F are disjoint. An interpretation is called two-valued if T ∪ F = H(P ).
Definition 12
Let P be an extended logic program, I an interpretation, and let P ′ (resp. I ′) be ob-
tained from P (resp. I) by replacing every literal ¬A by a new atom, say ¬ A. The GL-
transformation P
′
I′ is the program obtained from P
′ by removing all rules containing a
default literal not A such that A ∈ I ′, and then removing all remaining default literals
from P ′, obtaining a definite program P ′′. Let J be the least model of P ′′, i.e. J is the
least fixpoint of TP ′′(I) := {A | ∃A ← B1, . . . , Bn ∈ P ′′ s.t. Bi ∈ I}. Then ΓP I is
obtained from J by replacing the introduced atoms ¬ A by ¬A.
Definition 13
The semi-normal version of a program P is the program Ps obtained from P by replacing
every rule L← Body in P by the rule L← not ¬L,Body. If the program P is clear from
the context, we write ΓI for ΓP I and ΓsI for ΓPsI .
Note that the set ΓP I is just a set of literals; we will now use it to define the semantics
of P as a (paraconsistent) interpretation.
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Definition 14
LetP be a program whose least fixpoint of ΓΓs is T . Then the paraconsistent well-founded
model of P is the paraconsistent interpretation WFMp(P ) = T ∪ not (H(P ) − ΓsT ).
If WFMp(P ) is an interpretation, then P is called non-contradictory, and WFMp(P ) is
the well-founded model of P , denoted by WFM(P ).
The paraconsistent well-founded model can be defined iteratively by the transfinite se-
quence {Iα}:
I0 := ∅
Iα+1 := ΓΓsIα for successor ordinal α+ 1
Iλ :=
⋃
α<λ Iα for limit ordinal λ
There exists a smallest ordinal λ0 such that Iλ0 is the least fixpoint of ΓΓs, and
WFMp(P ) := Iλ0 ∪ not (H(P )− ΓsIλ0 ).
5.2 Equivalence of argumentation semantics and WFSXp
In this section, we will show that the argumentation semantics Ju/a and the well-founded
model coincide. That is, the conclusions of justified arguments are exactly the objective
literals which are true in the well-founded model; and those objective literals all of whose
arguments are overruled are exactly the literals which are false in the well-founded model.
The result holds also for contradictory programs under the paraconsistent well-founded
semantics. This is important, because it shows that contradictions in the argumentation
semantics are precisely the contradictions under the well-founded semantics, and allows
the application of contradiction removal (or avoidance) methods to the argumentation se-
mantics (Dama´sio et al. 1997). For non-contradictory programs, the well-founded seman-
tics coincides with the paraconsistent well-founded semantics (Alferes and Pereira 1996;
Dama´sio 1996); consequently, we obtain as a corollary that argumentation semantics and
well-founded semantics coincide for non-contradictory programs.
Before we come to the main theorem, we need the following Lemma, which shows a
precise connection between arguments and consequences of a program PI .
Lemma 15
Let I be a two-valued interpretation.
1. L ∈ Γ(I) iff ∃ argument A with conclusion L such that assm(A) ⊆ I .
2. L ∈ Γs(I) iff ∃ argument A with conclusion L such that assm(A) ⊆ I and
¬conc(A) ∩ I = ∅.
3. L 6∈ Γ(I) iff ∀ arguments A with conclusion L, assm(A) ∩ I 6⊆ ∅.
4. L 6∈ Γs(I) iff ∀ arguments A with conclusion L, assm(A) ∩ I 6⊆ ∅ or
¬conc(A) ∩ I 6= ∅.
Proof
See Appendix A.
In order to compare the argumentation semantics with the well-founded semantics, we
extend the definition conc(A) of the conclusions of a single argument A to work on a set
of arguments A. The extended definition conc(A) includes all positive and negative con-
clusions of arguments in A; i.e. those literals L ∈ conc(A), as well as the default literals
A Hierarchy of Argumentation Semantics 23
not L where all arguments for L are overruled by some argument A ∈ A. We will use this
definition of conc for the set of justified arguments Ju/a to compare the “argumentation
model” conc(Ju/a) to WFMp(P ), the well-founded model.
Definition 15
Let A be a set of arguments. Then
conc(A) =
⋃
A∈A
conc(A)∪{not L | all arguments for L are overruled by an argument A ∈ A}
With the above definition, we can formulate the main theorem that u/a-justified argu-
ments coincide with the well-founded semantics.
Theorem 16
Let P be an extended logic program. Then WFMp(P ) = conc(Ju/a).
Proof
First, note that A undercuts B iff ∃ L s.t. L ∈ conc(A) and not L ∈ assm(B); and A
rebuts B iff ∃ L ∈ conc(A) ∩ ¬conc(B).
We show that for all ordinals α, Iα = conc(Jαu/a), by transfinite induction on α. The proof
proceeds in two stages. First, we show that all objective literals L in WFMp(P ) are con-
clusions of u/a-justified arguments and second, that for all default negated literals not L
in WFMp(P ), all arguments for L are overruled.
Base case α = 0: Iα = ∅ = conc(Jαu/a)
Successor ordinal α α+ 1:
L ∈ Iα+1
iff (Def. of Iα+1)
L ∈ ΓΓsIα
iff (Lemma 15(1))
∃ argument A for L such that assm(A) ⊆ ΓsIα
iff (Def. of ⊆, and ΓsIα is two-valued)
∃ argument A for L such that ∀ not L ∈ assm(A), L 6∈ ΓsIα
iff (Lemma 15(4))
∃ argumentA for L such that ∀ not L ∈ assm(A), for any argumentB for L, ( ∃ not L′ ∈
assm(B) s.t. L′ ∈ Iα or ∃ L′′ ∈ conc(B) s.t. ¬L′′ ∈ Iα )
iff (Induction hypothesis)
∃ argumentA for L such that ∀ not L ∈ assm(A), for any argumentB for L, ( ∃ not L′ ∈
assm(B) s.t. ∃ argument C ∈ Jα
u/a for L
′
, or ∃ L′′ ∈ conc(B) s.t. ∃ argument C ∈ Jα
u/a
for ¬L′′)
iff (Def. of undercut and rebut)
∃ argument A for L such that for any undercut B to A, ( ∃ argument C ∈ Jα
u/a s.t. C
undercuts B, or ∃ argumentC ∈ Jα
u/a s.t. C rebuts B)
iff
∃ argumentA for L such that for any undercutB to A, ∃ argumentC ∈ Jα
u/a s.t. C attacks
B
iff (Def. of Jα+1
u/a )
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∃ argument A ∈ Jα+1
u/a for L
iff (Def. of conc)
L ∈ conc(Jα+1
u/a )
Limit ordinal λ:
Iλ =
⋃
α<λ Iα and Jλu/a =
⋃
α<λ J
α
u/a, so by induction hypothesis (Iα = conc(Jαu/a) for
all α < λ), Iλ = conc(Jλu/a).
Next we will show that a literal not L is in the well-founded semantics iff every argument
for L is overruled, i.e. not L ∈ WFMp(P ) implies not L ∈ conc(Ju/a).
not L ∈WFMp(P )
iff (Def. of WFMp(P ))
L 6∈ ΓsIλ
iff (Lemma 15(4)
for all argumentsA forL, ( ∃ not L′ ∈ assm(A) s.t. L′ ∈ Iλ, or ∃L′′ ∈ conc(A) s.t.¬L′′ ∈
Iλ )
iff (Iλ = conc(Jλu/a))
for all arguments A for L, ( ∃ not L′ ∈ assm(A) s.t. ∃ argument B ∈ Jλ
u/a for L
′
, or
∃ L′′ ∈ conc(A) s.t. ∃ argument B ∈ Jλ
u/a for ¬L
′′ )
iff (Def. of undercut and rebut)
for all arguments A for L, ( ∃ argument B ∈ Jλ
u/a s.t. B undercuts A, or ∃ argument
B ∈ Jλ
u/a s.t. B rebuts A )
iff
every argument for L is attacked by a justified argument in Jλ
u/a
iff (Def. of overruled)
every argument for L is overruled
iff (Def. of conc(Ju/a))
not L ∈ conc(Ju/a)
Corollary 17
Let P be a non-contradictory program. Then WFM(P ) = conc(Ju/a).
Remark 3
In a similar way, one can show that the Γ operator corresponds to undercuts, while the
Γs operator corresponds to attacks, and so the least fixpoints of ΓΓ, ΓsΓ, and ΓsΓs cor-
respond to Ju/u, Ja/u, and Ja/a, respectively. In (Alferes et al. 1995), the least fixpoints
of these operators are shown to be ordered as lfp(ΓsΓ) ⊆ lfp(ΓsΓs) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓs), and
lfp(ΓsΓ) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓ) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓs). Because Ja/u = Ja/a ⊆ Ju/u ⊆ Ju/a by Theorem 9,
we can strengthen this statement to lfp(ΓsΓ) = lfp(ΓsΓs) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓ) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓs).
The following corollary summarises the results so far.
Corollary 18
The least fixpoint argumentation semantics of Dung (Dung 1993), denoted JDung, of
Prakken and Sartor (Prakken and Sartor 1997), denoted JPS, and the well-founded seman-
tics for normal logic programs WFS (Bondarenko et al. 1997; van Gelder et al. 1991) and
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for logic programs with explicit negation WFSXp (Pereira and Alferes 1992; Alferes and Pereira 1996)
are related to the other least fixpoint argumentation semantics as illustrated in Figure 3.
su/a = su/d
su/u
nnnnnnn
su/sa
TTTTTTTTTT
sa/u = sa/d = sa/a
oooooo
su/su
QQQQQQQQ
jjjjjjjjjjj
u/a = u/d = u/sa =WFSXp
TTTTTTTTTT
sa/su = sa/sa
OOOOOO
nnnnnnn
u/su = u/u =WFS
TTTTTTTTTT
jjjjjjjj
d/su = d/u = d/a = d/d = d/sa = JPS
QQQQQQ
jjjjjjjj
a/su = a/u = a/a = a/d = a/sa = JDung
Fig. 3. Hierarchy of Notions of Justifiability and Existing Semantics
6 Proof Theory
One of the benefits of relating the argumentation semantics Ju/a to WFSXp is the exis-
tence of an efficient top-down proof procedure for WFSXp (Alferes et al. 1995), which we
can use to compute justified arguments in Ju/a. On the other hand, dialectical proof theo-
ries, based on dialogue trees, have been defined for a variety of argumentation semantics
(Simari et al. 1994; Prakken and Sartor 1997; Jakobovits and Vermeir 1999a; Kakas and Toni 1999).
In this section we present a sound and complete dialectical proof theory for the least fix-
point argumentation semantics Jx/y for any notions of attack x and y.
6.1 Dialogue trees
We adapt the dialectical proof theory of (Prakken and Sartor 1997) to develop a general
sound and complete proof theory for x/y-justified arguments.
Definition 16
Let P be an extended logic program. An x/y-dialogue is a finite nonempty sequence of
moves movei = (Player i, Argi)(i > 0), such that Playeri ∈ {P,O}, Argi ∈ ArgsP ,
and
1. Player i = P iff i is odd; and Player i = O iff i is even.
2. If Player i = Player j = P and i 6= j, then Argi 6= Argj .
3. If Player i = P and i > 1, then Argi is a minimal argument such that
(Argi, Argi−1) ∈ y.
4. If Player i = O, then (Argi, Argi−1) ∈ x.
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The first condition states that the players P (Proponent) and O (Opponent) take turns,
and P starts. The second condition prevents the proponent from repeating a move. The
third and fourth conditions state that both players have to attack the other player’s last
move, where the opponent is allowed to use the notion of attack x, while the proponent
may use y to defend its arguments. Note that the minimality condition in 3 is redundant,
because all arguments in ArgsP are required to be minimal by Definition 2. We have
explicitly repeated this condition, because it is important in that it prevents the proponent
from repeating an argument by adding irrelevant rules to it.
Definition 17
An x/y-dialogue tree is a tree of moves such that every branch is a x/y-dialogue, and for
all moves movei = (P,Argi), the children of movei are all those moves (O,Argj) such
that (Argj , Argi) ∈ x.
The height of a dialogue tree is 0 if it consists only of the root, and otherwise height(t) =
sup{height(ti)}+ 1 where ti are the trees rooted at the grandchildren of t.
Example 13
Consider the following program:
p ← q, not r
q ← not s
¬q ← u
r ← not t
s ← not t
t ← not w
u ← not v
v ← not r
¬v ← not t
A a/u-dialogue tree rooted at the argument [p← q, not r; q ← not s] is given by Figure 4.
Each node is marked with P for proponent or O for opponent, and an edge A x // B
denotes that A attacks B with the notion of attack x, i.e. (A,B) ∈ x.
Note that although dialogues are required to be finite, dialogue trees may be infinitely
branching. Therefore dialogue trees need not be finite, nor need their height be finite.
Example 14
Consider the following program P 4:
p(0)
p(s(X)) ← not q(X)
q(X) ← not p(X)
r ← q(X)
s ← not r
4 Note that by definition, programs are not allowed to contain variables. Here, X denotes a variable, and P is an
abbreviation for the (infinite) program obtained by substituting the terms sn(0) for the variable X , in all the
rules.
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P : [p← q, not r; q ← not s]
O : [r ← not t]
u
44jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
O : [¬q ← u;u← not v]
r
OO
O : [s← not t]
u
jjTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
P : [t← not w]
u
OO
P : [v ← not r]
u
OO
P : [t← not w]
u
OO
O : [r ← not t]
u
OO
O : [¬v ← not t]
r
jjTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
P : [t← not w]
u
OO
P : [t← not w]
u
OO
Fig. 4. An a/u-dialogue tree
For each n ∈ N, there is exactly one minimal argument An with conclusion p(sn(0)),
namely [p(0)] for n = 0, and [p(sn(0)) ← not q(sn−1(0))] for n > 0. Similarly,
there is exactly one minimal argument Bn with conclusion q(sn(0)), namely [q(sn(0))←
not p(sn(0))].
Therefore, a u/u-dialogue tree rooted at An+1 consists of just one dialogue Tn+1 of the
form ((P,An+1), (O,Bn), Tn). A u/u-dialogue tree rooted at A0 consists only of the root,
because there are no undercuts to A0. Thus, the height of the dialogue tree Tn is n.
Now consider the u/u-dialogue tree rooted at the argument C = [s ← not r]. The ar-
gument C is undercut by infinitely many arguments Dn = [r ← q(sn(0)); q(sn(0)) ←
not p(sn(0))]; each Dn is undercut by exactly one argument: An. A dialogue in the u/u-
dialogue tree TC rooted at argument C is therefore a sequence ((P,C), (O,Bn), Tn). Be-
cause height(Tn) = n, then by Definition 17: height(TC) = sup{height(Tn) | n ∈
N}+ 1 = ω + 1.
Definition 18
A player wins an x/y-dialogue iff the other player cannot move. A player wins an x/y-
dialogue tree iff it wins all branches of the tree. An x/y-dialogue tree which is won by the
proponent is called a winning x/y-dialogue tree.
We show that the proof theory of x/y-dialogue trees is sound and complete for any
notions of attack x and y.
Theorem 19
An argument A is x/y-justified iff there exists a x/y-dialogue tree with A as its root, and
won by the proponent.
Proof
We show by transfinite induction that for all arguments A, for all ordinals α: A ∈ Jαx/y if
and only if there exists a winning x/y-dialogue tree of height≤ α for A. See Appendix A
for the detailed proof.
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7 Related Work
There has been much work on argument-theoretic semantics for normal logic programs, i.e.
logic programs with default negation (Bondarenko et al. 1997; Dung 1995; Kakas and Toni 1999).
Because there is no explicit negation, there is only one form of attack, the undercut in our
terminology. An abstract argumentation framework has been defined, which captures other
default reasoning mechanisms besides normal logic programming. Within this framework,
a variety of semantics may be defined, such as preferred extensions; stable extensions,
which are equivalent to stable models (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988); and a least fixpoint
semantics based on the acceptability of arguments, which is equivalent to the well-founded
semantics (van Gelder et al. 1991). The latter fixpoint semantics forms the basis of our
argumentation semantics. Proof theories and proof procedures for some of these argumen-
tation semantics have been developed in (Kakas and Toni 1999).
There has been some work extending this argumentation semantics to logic programs
with explicit negation. Dung (Dung 1995) adapts the framework of (Dung 1993), by dis-
tinguishing between ground attacks and reductio-ad-absurdum-attacks, in our terminol-
ogy undercuts and rebuts. Argumentation semantics analogous to those of normal logic
programs are defined, and the stable extension semantics is shown to be equivalent to
the answer set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1990), an adaptation of the stable model
semantics to extended logic programs. A least fixpoint semantics (called grounded seman-
tics) based on a notion of acceptability is defined, and related to the well-founded semantics
of (van Gelder et al. 1991), although only for the case of programs without explicit nega-
tion.
Prakken and Sartor (Prakken and Sartor 1997) define an argumentation semantics for
extended logic programs similar to that of Dung. Their language is more expressive in that
it distinguishes between strict rules, which may not be attacked, and defeasible rules, which
may be attacked. Furthermore, rules have priorities, and rebuts are only permitted against a
rule of equal or lower priority. Thus, rebuts are not necessarily symmetric, as in our setting.
Our language corresponds to Prakken and Sartor’s without strict rules, and either without
priorities, or, equivalently, if all rules have the same priority. The semantics is given as
a least fixpoint of an acceptability operator, analogous to Dung’s grounded semantics. A
proof theory, similar to those of Kakas and Toni (Kakas and Toni 1999) is developed. This
proof theory formed the basis of our general proof theory for justified arguments.
In (Mo´ra and Alferes 1998), an argumentation semantics for extended logic programs,
similar to Prakken and Sartor’s, is proposed; it is influenced by WFSX, and distinguishes
between sceptical and credulous conclusions of an argument. It also provides a proof theory
based on dialogue trees, similar to Prakken and Sartor’s.
Defeasible Logic Programming (Garcı´a and Simari 2004; Simari et al. 1994; Garcı´a et al. 1998)
is a formalism very similar to Prakken and Sartor’s, based on the first order logic argumen-
tation framework of (Simari and Loui 1992). It includes logic programming with two kinds
of negation, distinction between strict and defeasible rules, and allowing for various criteria
for comparing arguments. Its semantics is given operationally, by proof procedures based
on dialectical trees (Garcı´a and Simari 2004; Simari et al. 1994). In (Chesn˜evar et al. 2002),
the semantics of Defeasible Logic Programming is related to the well-founded semantics,
albeit only for the restricted language corresponding to normal logic programs (van Gelder et al. 1991).
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The answer set semantics for extended logic programs (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1990) is
defined via extensions which are stable under a certain program transformation. While this
semantics is a natural extension of stable models (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and pro-
vides an elegant model-theoretic semantics, there are several drawbacks which the answer
set semantics inherits from the stable models. In particular, there is no efficient top-down
proof procedure for the answer set semantics, because the truth value of a literal L may de-
pend on the truth value of a literal L′ which does not occur in the proof tree below L 5. The
well-founded semantics (van Gelder et al. 1991) is an approximation of the stable model
semantics, for which an efficient top-down proof procedure exists. In (Przymusinski 1990),
the well-founded semantics is adapted to extended logic programs. However, this semantics
does not comply with the coherence principle, which states that explicit negation implies
implicit negation. In order to overcome this, (Pereira and Alferes 1992; Alferes and Pereira 1996)
developed WFSX, a well-founded semantics for extended logic programs, which satisfies
the coherence principle. It has several desirable properties not enjoyed by the answer set
semantics; in particular, an efficient goal-oriented top-down proof procedure for WFSX
is presented in (Alferes et al. 1995). WFSX is well established and e.g. widely available
through Prolog implementations such as XSB Prolog (Freire et al. 1997).
Our own work is complementary to these approaches, in that we fill a gap by bringing
argumentation and WFSX together in our definition of u/a-justified arguments, which are
equivalent to WFSXp (Dama´sio 1996; Alferes and Pereira 1996; Alferes et al. 1995), the
paraconsistent version of WFSX. Furthermore, the generality of our framework allows us
to relate existing argumentation semantics such as Dung’s and Prakken and Sartor’s ap-
proach and thus provide a concise characterisation of all the existing semantics mentioned
above.
A number of authors (Kraus et al. 1998; Parsons and Jennings 1996; Sierra et al. 1997;
Parsons et al. 1998; Sadri et al. 2001; Torroni 2002; Schroeder 1999; Mo´ra and Alferes 1998)
work on argumentation for negotiating agents. Of these, the approaches of (Sadri et al. 2001;
Torroni 2002; Schroeder 1999) are based on logic programming. The advantage of the
logic programming approach for arguing agents is the availability of goal-directed, top-
down proof procedures. This is vital when implementing systems which need to react in
real-time and therefore cannot afford to compute all justified arguments, as would be re-
quired when a bottom-up argumentation semantics would be used.
In (Sadri et al. 2001; Torroni 2002), abduction is used to define agent negotiation fo-
cusing on the generation of negotiation dialogues using abduction. This work is relevant
in that it shows how to embed an argumentation proof procedure into a dialogue proto-
col, which is needed to apply proof procedures of argumentation semantics as defined in
this paper into agent communication languages such as KQML (Finin et al. 1994) or FIPA
ACL (Chiariglione et al. 1997).
With a variety of argument-based approaches being pursued to define negotiating agents,
the problem of how these agents may inter-operate arises. This paper could serve as a first
step towards inter-operation as existing approaches can be placed in our framework, thus
making it easier to compare them.
5 See the extensive discussion in (Alferes and Pereira 1996) for details.
30 Ralf Schweimeier and Michael Schroeder
8 Conclusion and Further Work
We have identified various notions of attack for extended logic programs. Based on these
notions of attack, we defined notions of acceptability and least fixpoint semantics. The
contributions of this paper are five-fold.
• First, we defined a parameterised hierarchy of argumentation semantics by estab-
lishing a lattice of justified arguments based on set inclusion. We showed which
argumentation semantics are equal, which are subsets of one another and which are
neither.
• Second, we examined some properties of the different semantics, and gave a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for a semantics to satisfy the coherence principle (Alferes and Pereira 1996),
and a sufficient criterion for a semantics to be consistent.
• Third, we identified an argumentation semantics Ju/a equal to the paraconsistent
well-founded semantics for logic programs with explicit negation, WFSXp (Dama´sio 1996;
Alferes and Pereira 1996) and proved this equivalence.
• Forth, we established relationships between existing semantics, in particular that
JDung ( JPS ( Ju/u = WFS ( Ju/a = WFSXp, where JDung and JPS are
the least fixpoint argumentation semantics of Dung (Dung 1993) and Prakken and
Sartor (Prakken and Sartor 1997), and WFS is the well-founded semantics without
explicit negation (van Gelder et al. 1991).
• Fifth, we have defined a dialectical proof theory for argumentation. For all notions of
justified arguments introduced, we prove that the proof theory is sound and complete
wrt. the corresponding fixpoint argumentation semantics.
It remains to be seen whether a variation in the notion of attack yields interesting varia-
tions of alternative argumentation semantics for extended logic programs such as preferred
extensions or stable extensions (Dung 1993). It is also an open question how the hierarchy
changes when priorities are added as defined in (Antoniou 2002; Kakas and Moraitis 2002;
Prakken and Sartor 1997; Brewka 1996; Garcı´a et al. 1998; Vreeswijk 1997).
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Appendix A Proofs of Theorems
Theorem 3
Let x′ ⊆ x and y ⊆ y′ be notions of attack, then Jx/y ⊆ Jx′/y′ .
Proof
We show by transfinite induction that Jαx/y ⊆ Jαx′/y′ , for all α.
Base case: α = 0: Then Jx/y = ∅ = Jx′/y′ .
Successor ordinal: α α+ 1:
Let A ∈ Jα+1x/y , and (B,A) ∈ x
′
. Then also (B,A) ∈ x, and so there exists C ∈ Jαx/y
such that (C,B) ∈ y, so also (C,B) ∈ y′. By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Jαx′/y′ , and so
A ∈ Jα+1x′/y′ .
Limit ordinal λ:
Assume Jαx/y ⊆ J
α
x′/y for all α < λ. Then
Jλx/y =
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/y ⊆
⋃
α<λ J
α
x′/y′ = J
λ
x′/y′
Theorem 4
Let x and and y be notions of attack such that x ⊇ undercuts, and let sy = y−undercuts−1.
Then Jx/y = Jx/sy .
Proof
By Theorem 3, we have Jx/sy ⊆ Jx/y . We prove the inverse inclusion by showing that for
all ordinals α: Jαx/y ⊆ Jαx/sy , by transfinite induction on α.
Base case α = 0: Jx/y = ∅ = Jx/sy .
Successor ordinal α α+ 1: Let A ∈ Jα+1x/y , and (B,A) ∈ x. By definition, there exists
C ∈ Jαx/y such that (C,B) ∈ y. By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Jαx/sy .
If B does not undercut C, then we are done. If, however, B undercuts C, then because
C ∈ Jαx/sy , and undercuts ⊆ x, there exists D ∈ J
α0
x/sy(α0 < α) such that (D,B) ∈ sy.
It follows that A ∈ Jα+1x/sy .
Limit ordinal λ: Assume Jαx/y ⊆ Jαx/sy for all α < λ. Then Jλx/y =
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/y ⊆⋃
α<λ J
α
x/sy = J
λ
x/sy
Theorem 6
Let x be a notion of attack such that x ⊇ strongly attacks. Then Jx/u = Jx/d = Jx/a.
Proof
It is sufficient to show that Jx/a ⊆ Jx/u. Then by Theorem 3, Jx/u ⊆ Jx/d ⊆ Jx/a = Jx/u.
We prove by transfinite induction that for all ordinals α: Jαx/a ⊆ Jαx/u.
Base case: α = 0
Jαx/a = ∅ = J
α
x/u.
Successor ordinal: α α+ 1
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LetA ∈ Jα+1x/a , and (B,A) ∈ x. By definition, there exists C ∈ J
α
x/a such thatC undercuts
or rebuts B. By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Jαx/u.
If C undercuts B, then we are done. If, however, C does not undercut B, then C rebuts
B, and so B also rebuts C, i.e. B strongly attacks C. Because strongly attacks ⊆ x and
C ∈ Jαx/u, there exists D ∈ J
α0
x/u ⊆ J
α
x/u (α0 < α) such that D undercuts B. It follows
that A ∈ Jα+1x/u .
Limit ordinal λ:
Assume Jαx/a ⊆ J
α
x/u for all α < λ. Then J
λ
x/a =
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/a ⊆
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/u = J
λ
x/u.
Theorem 7
Jsa/su = Jsa/sa
Proof
By Theorem 3, Jsa/su ⊆ Jsa/sa.
We prove the inverse inclusion by showing that for all ordinals α: Jα
sa/sa ⊆ J
α
sa/su, by
transfinite induction on α.
Base case: n = 0
J0
sa/sa = ∅ = J
0
sa/su
Successor ordinal: α α+ 1
Let A ∈ Jα+1
sa/sa, and B strongly attacks A. By definition, there exists C ∈ J
α
sa/sa such that
C attacks B and B does not undercut C. By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Jα
sa/su.
If C undercuts B, then we are done. If, however, C rebuts B and C does not undercut
B, then B also rebuts C, i.e. B strongly attacks C, and so because C ∈ Jα
sa/su there
exists D ∈ Jα0
sa/su ⊆ J
α
sa/su (α0 < α) such that D strongly undercuts B. It follows that
A ∈ Jα+1
sa/su(∅).
Limit ordinal λ:
Assume Jα
sa/sa ⊆ J
α
sa/su for all α < λ. Then J
λ
sa/sa =
⋃
α<λ J
α
sa/sa ⊆
⋃
α<λ J
α
sa/su =
Jλ
sa/su.
Theorem 8
Jsu/a = Jsu/d
Proof
By Theorem 3, Jsu/d ⊆ Jsu/a.
For the inverse inclusion, we show that for all ordinals α: Jα
su/a ⊆ J
α
su/d, by transfinite
induction on α.
Base case: α = 0
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J0
su/a = ∅ = J
0
su/d
Successor ordinal: α α+ 1
Let A ∈ Jα+1
su/a , and B strongly undercutsA. By definition, there exists C ∈ J
α
su/a such that
C undercuts or rebuts B. By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Jα
su/d.
If C undercuts B, or B does not undercut C, then we are done.
Otherwise, B strongly undercuts C, and so there exists D ∈ Jα0
su/d ⊆ J
α
su/d (α0 < α)
such that D defeats B. It follows that A ∈ Jα+1
su/d .
Limit ordinal λ:
Assume Jα
su/a ⊆ J
α
su/d for all α < λ. Then
Jλ
su/a =
⋃
α<λ
Jα
su/a ⊆
⋃
α<λ
Jα
su/d = J
λ
su/d
Lemma 15
Let I be a two-valued interpretation.
1. L ∈ Γ(I) iff ∃ argument A with conclusion L such that assm(A) ⊆ I .
2. L ∈ Γs(I) iff ∃ argument A with conclusion L such that assm(A) ⊆ I and
¬conc(A) ∩ I = ∅.
3. L 6∈ Γ(I) iff ∀ arguments A with conclusion L, assm(A) ∩ I 6= ∅.
4. L 6∈ Γs(I) iff ∀ arguments A with conclusion L, assm(A) ∩ I 6= ∅ or
¬conc(A) ∩ I 6= ∅.
Proof
1. “Only If”-direction: Induction on the length n of the derivation of L ∈ Γ(I).
Base case: n = 1:
Then there exists a rule L ← not L1, . . . , not Ln in P s.t. L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I , and
[L ← not L1, . . . , not Ln] is an argument for L whose assumptions are contained
in I .
Induction step: n n+ 1:
Let L ∈ Γn+1(I). Then there exists a rule r = L ← L1, . . . , Ln, not L′1, . . . , L′m
in P s.t. Li ∈ Γn(I), and L′i 6∈ I . By induction hypothesis, there exists arguments
A1, . . . , An for L1, . . . , Ln with assm(Ai) ⊆ I . Then A = [r] · A1 · · ·An is an
argument for L such that assm(A) ⊆ I .
“If” direction: Induction on the length of the argument.
Base case: n = 1:
Then A = [L ← not L1, . . . , not Ln], and L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I . Then L ←∈ PI , and
L ∈ Γ1(I).
Induction step: n n+ 1
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Let A = [L ← L1, . . . , Ln, not L′1, . . . , not L′m; r2, . . . , rn] be an argument s.t.
assm(A) ⊆ I .A contains subargumentsA1, . . . , An forL1, . . . , Ln, with assm(Ai) ⊆
I . Because L′1, . . . , L′m 6∈ I , then L ← L1, . . . , Ln ∈ PI . By induction hypothesis,
Li ∈ Γ(I). so also L ∈ Γ(I).
2. “Only If”-direction: Induction on the length n of the derivation of L ∈ Γs(I).
Base case: n = 1:
Then there exists a rule L← not L1, . . . , not Ln in P s.t. ¬L,L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I , and
[L ← not L1, . . . , not Ln] is an argument for L whose assumptions are contained
in I , and ¬L 6∈ I .
Induction step: n n+ 1:
Let L ∈ Γn+1(I). Then there exists a rule r = L ← L1, . . . , Ln, not L′1, . . . , L′m
in P s.t. Li ∈ Γn(I), L′i 6∈ I , and ¬L 6∈ I . By induction hypothesis, there exists
arguments A1, . . . , An for L1, . . . , Ln with assm(Ai) ⊆ I and ¬conc(Ai) ∩ I =
∅. Then A = [r] · A1 · · ·An is an argument for L such that assm(A) ⊆ I , and
¬conc(A) ∩ I = ∅.
“If” direction: Induction on the length of the argument.
Base case: n = 1:
Then A = [L ← not L1, . . . , not Ln], and ¬L,L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I . Then L ←∈ PsI ,
and L ∈ Γ1(I).
Induction step: n n+ 1:
Let A = [L ← L1, . . . , Ln, not L′1, . . . , not L′m; r2, . . . , rn] be an argument s.t.
assm(A) ⊆ I , and ¬conc(A) ∩ I = ∅. A contains subarguments A1, . . . , An for
L1, . . . , Ln, with assm(Ai) ⊆ I , and¬conc(Ai)∩I = ∅. BecauseL′1, . . . , L′m 6∈ I ,
and ¬L 6∈ I , then L ← L1, . . . , Ln ∈ PI . By induction hypothesis, Li ∈ Γ(I), so
also L ∈ Γ(I).
3. and 4. follow immediately from 1. and 2. because I is two-valued.
Theorem 19
An argument A is x/y-justified iff there exists a x/y-dialogue tree with A as its root, and
won by the proponent.
Proof
“If”-direction. We show by transfinite induction: If A ∈ Jαx/y , then there exists a winning
x/y-dialogue tree of height≤ α for A.
Base case α = 0:
Then there exists no argumentB such that (B,A) ∈ x, and so A is a winning x/y-dialogue
tree for A of height 0.
Successor ordinal α+ 1:
If A ∈ Jα+1x/y , then for any Bi such that (Bi, A) ∈ x there exists a Ci ∈ J
α
x/y such that
(Ci, Bi) ∈ y. By induction hypothesis, there exist winning x/y-dialogue trees for the Ci.
Furthermore, if any of the Ci contains a move m = (P,A), then it also contains a winning
subtree for A rooted at m and we are done. Otherwise, we have a winning tree rooted at A,
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with children Bi, whose children are the winning trees for Ci.
Limit ordinal λ:
If A ∈ Jλx/y , then there exists an α < λ such that A ∈ J
α
x/y; by induction hypothesis, there
exists a winning x/y-dialogue tree of height α for A.
“Only-if”-direction. We prove by transfinite induction: If there exists a winning tree of
height α for A, then A ∈ Jαx/y.
Note that by definition, the height of a dialogue tree is either 0 or a successor ordinal
α+1. So we prove the base case 0, and for the induction step, we assume that the induction
hypothesis holds for all β < α+ 1.
Base case α = 0:
Then there are no arguments B such that (B,A) ∈ x, and so A ∈ J0x/y .
Successor ordinal α+ 1:
Let T be a tree with rootA, whose children areBi, and the children of Bi are winning trees
rooted at Ci. By induction hypothesis, Ci ∈ Jαx/y . Because the Bi are all those arguments
such that (Bi, A) ∈ x, then A is defended against each Bi by Ci, and so A ∈ Jα+1x/y .
